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OBSERVING COURT RESPONSES TO VICTIMS OF RAPE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 
 
Olivia Smith and Tina Skinner (University of Bath contact: os212@bath.ac.uk) 
 
Despite years of policy reform in England and Wales, court responses to sexual 
violence victims remain inadequate. Much of the literature relies on interviews, is 
outdated by policy or ignores underlying assumptions. This study therefore observed 
rape and sexual assault trials, identifying underlying assumptions in the data using 
critical discourse analysis. The main emergent themes were: routine delays, the notion 
of ‘rational’ behaviour, extreme interpretations of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and 
‘burden of proof’, and winning as priority. These highlight the need to move beyond 
focusing purely on short-term change and begin addressing the fundamental 
inadequacies of court responses to sexual violence victims. 
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The Criminal Justice System (CJS) in England and Wales is persistently critiqued for poor 
responses to rape and, despite years of policy reform, courts resist change (Brown, Hovarth, Kelly 
and Westmarland, 2010). Even with a plethora of good quality research on these issues, several 
gaps in the literature remain. For example, most studies use interviews with victims or legal 
personnel; but court observations, which explore actions rather than stated attitudes, are rare. In 
addition, the focus tends to be on identifying problematic practices rather than their underlying 
causes; the research that does attempt to do this is now outdated by important policy changes 
(see Ellison, 2001). This study therefore uses observations to explore judges and barristers 
treatment of rape, seeking to understand such treatment in relation to the underlying context of 
the English and Welsh CJS.  
Existing literature, policy and practice 
 
Common identified problems 
Research highlights two main problems faced by rape victims in England and Wales: high 
attrition ratesi and inadequate treatment. Rape conviction rates have been identified as low, for 
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example in 2006/7 only 6.5 percent of reported rapes resulted in a conviction (Kelly and Lovett, 
2009). Most attrition occurs at the police stage (Kelly, Lovett and Regan, 2005); however court 
conviction rates are also thought to be lower than expected (Brown, Hamilton and O’Neill, 2007). 
In 2008, only 38 percent of proceededii rape cases achieved convictioniii compared to 69 percent 
of proceeded ‘violence against a person’ cases in the same year (Walby, Armstrong and Strid, 
2010). This is especially worrying since the difficulty of obtaining a conviction at trial is the most 
common justification for attrition at earlier stages (Brown et al, 2007; Ellison, 2000).  
Other convictions rates have been suggested, for example Stern (2010) uses unofficial 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) data to argue that the jury conviction rate for rape was 58 
percent in 2009. The contradictions between these conviction rates could be linked to differences 
in what the data includes. For example, Stern’s figure includes convictions for lesser offences, 
seems to only refer to jury trial outcomes, and is unclear about whether or not non-adult victims 
are included. Stern (2010) notes that this lack of clarity and consistency is problematic and 
should be rectified. Regardless of debates about statistics, though, Westmarland (2008) argues 
that focusing only on attrition remains problematic because it removes the focus from victim 
treatment. 
There is consistent evidence of revictimisation by the CJS (Ellison, 2007) and it is for this 
reason we use the term ‘victim’ rather than ‘survivor’ (see also Yancy Martin, 2005). 
Revictimisation has been found to occur in several ways and these are well discussed in the 
literature (Ellison, 2000; Jordan, 2001; Skinner and Taylor, 2009). For example, despite research 
indicating that victims need to feel in control (Campbell, 2008); Skinner and Taylor (2009) found 
they were rarely consulted on important decisions (Skinner and Taylor, 2009). Payne (2009) 
suggested victims are often left uninformed, despite policies ‘guaranteeing’ they will be kept up-
to-date (see Home Office, 2005). Stern (2010) adds that victims also receive little information 
about what to expect from the CJS, leaving them with unrealistic expectations that cannot be met. 
There are several documents outlining what victims can expect, for example ‘The Prosecutors’ 
Pledge’iv (Crown Prosecution Service [CPS], 2005) and Code of Practice for Victims (Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform, 2005, 2009) however Payne (2009) states that victims do not know 
which list to use. The expectations outlined can also be problematic, for example the 
‘Prosecutors’ Pledge’ promises victims protection from ‘irrelevant’ attacks against their character 
(CPS, 2005); but the victim’s interpretation of irrelevant may differ from a barrister’s. 
Delays and cancellations at the start of trial have also been identified as traumatic for 
victims (Payne, 2009). Although sentence reductions are larger when guilty pleas occur earlier in 
the criminal justice process, there is still a ten per cent reduction in sentence if defendants plead 
guilty on the day of trial (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2007). This means the defence often 
risks waiting until then in the hope the victim will withdraw beforehand (Payne 2009). Victims 
can therefore anxiously prepare for trial only to find that it is cancelled or delayed by legal 
arguments. There is some good practice being identified, though; for example trials are 
occasionally listed to start in the afternoon so that the victim is not summoned on the first day 
(Payne, 2009). 
Kelly, Temkin and Griffiths (2006) also suggest that despite the implementation of special 
measures to improve victim experiences, victims are routinely intimidated and asked about their 
sexual history, in order to discredit them and imply the presence of consent. This may involve the 
assumption that women with more sexual experience are more likely to make a false allegation, 
despite American research indicting evidence to the contrary (Flowe, Ebbesen and Putcha-
Bhagavatula, 2007). The 1999 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act restricted use of sexual 
history unless one of four requirements is satisfied and a written application is made pre-trial. 
These requirements are that the evidence is 1) relevant but does not relate to consent, or 2) 
relevant to proving consent and the ‘sexual activity’ occurred around the same time as the alleged 
events or 3) was too similar to the alleged events to be coincidental or 4) relates to questions 
raised during the victim’s evidence-in-chief (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999). In 
spite of this, the fact that the meaning of ‘relevant’ and ‘sexual activity’ is left open to judicial 
interpretation means that sexual history ‘evidence’ remains common, mostly occurring without 
any application (Kelly et al, 2006). In addition, sexual history evidence may be used to support 
the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999); 
which may undermine the restrictions since arguments for consent and the reasonable belief in 
consent are likely to be closely linked (V. Baird, personal communication 11th December 2011). 
 
Attempts at improvement 
Policy reform has attempted to improve CJS responses to sexual violence in England and Wales. 
This has involved extending the definition of rape to include marital (1991) and male rape 
(1994); and recognising oral rape as more than sexual assault (Sexual Offences Act, 2003). In 
addition, defendants are now required to show any claimed belief in consent was reasonable and 
the jury can assume the absence of consent in certain situations (Sexual Offences Act, 2003). 
These situations include fear of violence, or actual violence, against the victim or a third party; 
the victim being unconscious, involuntarily intoxicated or unlawfully detained; or the victim 
having a disability that limits their capacity to consent (Sexual Offences Act, 2003). In addition, if 
the defendant is found to have intentionally deceived the victim about the fundamental nature 
and purpose of the contact, or by impersonating someone (else) known personally to the victim; 
then consent cannot be possible and the defendant must be convicted (Sexual Offences Act, 
2003). There has not been any systematic evaluation about how effective this has been, however 
research suggests it has made little different to trials (McGlynn, 2010). 
Attempts at improving victim treatment include the introduction of special measures, the 
Code of Practice for Victims and the 2007 Sexual Violence and Abuse Action Plan (SVAAP). The 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 introduced special measures, including using 
screens, giving evidence via video link or playing the recorded police interview, removal of 
formal legal dress and emptying the public gallery (Home Office, 2005). Kebbell, O’Kelly and 
Gilchrist (2007) indicate such measures successfully reduce anxiety in victims; however others 
argue that delivery remains inconsistent and that some legal personnel believe juries prefer live 
evidence to video evidence so such tactics may be detrimental for convictionsv (Payne, 2009; 
Stern, 2010). The Code of Practice for Victims (Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2005; 2009) 
also attempted to improve victims’ experiences by setting out a minimum standard of service 
they should expect. These standards include being kept updated and referred to Victim Support; 
although research suggests implementation is ‘patchy’ (Payne, 2009). The 2007 SVAAP 
represents a more holistic attempt at improving responses to rape; including introducing training 
for all prosecution barristers dealing with sexual violence cases (Home Office, 2007). Each court 
circuit can undertake their own training, as long as it is accredited by the CPS and/or Bar Council. 
It usually involves sessions about CPS expectations of prosecutors, how to prepare for trial and 
how to make the appropriate pre-trial applications (see Western Circuit, 2011). In addition, 
training can involve a psychological perspective on rape myths and information about SARCsvi, 
intermediaries and the use of expert evidence (see Western Circuit, 2011). Finally, training can 
include judicial perspectives on prosecuting rape, which are likely to be influential because of the 
authority that judges have. Defence barristers, who are the most commonly criticised, do not 
always receive training, though, and training may be perceived by recipients as ineffective 
(Smith, 2009). Finally, improvements have also been attempted through providing judges with 
guidelines about directions to the jury (see Judicial Studies Board, 2010). These directions can 
include ‘myth-busters’, which highlight some of the realities of rape in a balanced and informative 
way so as to help jurors look beyond the common stereotypes (see Judicial Studies Board, 2010).  
Large-scale Government reviews by Sara Payne (2009) and Baroness Stern (2010), 
concluded that policies are commendable but not fully effective. Payne’s (2009) review asserted 
the need to tackle unrealistic expectations and delays. Stern (2010) added to Payne’s comments 
by highlighting that victims misunderstand the role of the prosecution barrister. She therefore 
discussed the introduction of victims’ lawyers to represent the victim as the defence barrister 
represents the defendant (Stern, 2010). It has been suggested that a victims’ lawyer could act as 
an intermediary during questioning to, at least partially, address manipulation (Taslitz, 1999). 
The most comprehensive form of victim’s lawyer, proposed by Wilson (2005), could provide 
advocacy and representation throughout the whole legal process, including sentencing and 
compensation decisions. Legal personnel would probably try to reject this because of the 
perceived impingement on defendants’ rights and so we may benefit from exploring the role of 
victim’s lawyers in other countries, where the changes have been successfully brought in despite 
any potential objections. England and Wales are the only nations in the original 15 European 
Union member states not to provide victims with some sort of independent legal representation; 
suggesting it does not contravene access to fair trial (Raitt, 2010). The role of victim’s lawyers 
discussed ranges from simply ensuring that sexual history evidence rules are adhered to, as in 
Ireland (Kelly and Lovett, 2009; Stern, 2010), to having a role comparable to defence barristers 
when the victim becomes an auxiliary prosecutor in Germany (Kelly and Lovett, 2009; Sanders 
and Jones, 2007). 
The debate about these lawyers could be enhanced by looking at literature on victims’ 
rights. Defendants’ rights have traditionally been considered absolute because of their 
foundations in civil liberties, for example the right to fair trial is cemented in the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (Londono, 2007). However, “Convention law recognises that 
the rights of the defendant may sometimes be circumscribed by the need to respect the rights of 
victims and witnesses” (Powles, 2009:328). For example, the European Court ruled that banning 
defendants from representing themselves in sexual violence cases in England and Wales did not 
impinge on fair trial (Londono, 2007). While there is not a specific set of human rights for victims, 
they are arguably enshrined in the ECHR (Doak, 2008). Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR acknowledge 
the need to protect against degrading treatment and invasions of privacy (Londono, 2007). This 
requires effective laws and investigations to protect the public from crime, and protection against 
traumatic trial experiences (Londono, 2007). The European Court has ruled that trials do 
sometimes become so intimidating or intrusive as to breach Articles 3 or 8 in their own right and 
so courts must try harder to ensure that procedures are less traumatic (Doak, 2008; Londono, 
2007).  
It could be argued that since the right to fair trial is relatively ‘negotiable’ while Article 3 is 
absolute, we should prioritise victims’ rights (Londono, 2007). Despite this, defendants’ rights 
are important and it seems that “no one set of rights should prevail, and both sets of rights should 
be afforded equal respect” (Doak, 2008:247). It therefore appears that measures, such as victim’s 
lawyers, aiming to improve victim experiences in court have a basis in civil liberties (Raitt, 2010). 
Despite these arguments, the victim’s lawyer did not make it into Stern’s (2010) final 
recommendations, and was ignored by the Government response to the review (Cabinet Office, 
2011:3). However, in this document Theresa May, the Home Secretary and Equalities Minister, 
highlighted that responses to rape are “a long-term issue that needs long-term solutions” 
(Cabinet Office, 2011:3). The document also recognised the need for further improvement of CJS 
responses to victims, with the aim “that every victim be treated with dignity” (Cabinet Office, 
2011:17). This, it argues, involves ensuring “that every investigation and that prosecution be 
conducted thoroughly and professionally, without recourse to myths and stereotypes” (Cabinet 
Office, 2011). Such a response seems positive, and should be celebrated if it leads to concrete 
improvements. Having said that, there is a notable absence of discussion about expectations of 
defence barristers, and it is unclear whether the quote above refers to the general act of 
prosecution or merely the prosecutor not referring to myths. 
Explaining policy ineffectiveness 
In England and Wales, we cannot simply hope the effects of policy will eventually kick in, as 
countries like Australia, Canada and the US report similar problems despite implementing 
policies around ten years earlier (Daly and Boujours, 2008). Research attempting to explain 
policy ineffectiveness has suggested causes such as a focus on efficiency and targets (Temkin, 
1999) and a failure to properly monitor CJS agencies (Jordan, 2001). A lack of sanctions for falling 
short (Skinner and Taylor, 2009) and the inherent tension between the roles of CJS professionals 
and victim needs have also been suggested (Jordan, 2001; Kelly et al, 2006). Skinner and Taylor 
(2009) also suggest it takes more time, money and effort to transform entrenched discourses and 
cultures than policy ‘solutions’ may convey. Crow and Gertz (2008) have identified court cultures 
at local, regional and national levels, and Ulmer and Johnson (2004) believe they influence how 
courts are run at least as much as formal rules. Those who do not comply with cultural ‘norms’ 
may be perceived very negatively and are often ostracised by their colleagues, since reputation 
appears to be highly important amongst legal personnel (Hall, 2009). In addition, these cultural 
norms are considered part of professional conduct and so legal personnel aiming to be successful 
have an incentive to follow them (see Ostrom, Hanson, Ostrom and Kleiman, 2005). One example 
of court culture is judicial passivity, which Ellison (2000) thought to be rife because too much 
intervention in trials has been grounds for successful appeal and this reflects badly on the judge. 
Court cultures may therefore act as barriers to policy implementation. 
Rape myths are another common explanation. These stereotypes are held by both the 
public and CJS personnel, and result in victims being considered at least partly culpable if they 
are not unequivocally blameless and visibly upset (Ellison and Munro, 2009; Rose, Nadler and 
Clark, 2006; Temkin and Krahé, 2008). In reality, victims react differently and should never be 
held responsible for their rape (Temkin and Krahé, 2008). Attempts at educating legal personnel 
about rape myths have been identified by Stern (2010) as  failing to be fully effective and having 
the potential to perpetuate stereotypes if not properly formulated. For example, in previous 
interviews with legal personnel, all commented that they had not found training useful and one 
stated that training taught him to be suspicious if a victim was visibly distressed (Smith, 2009). 
Here, training was presumably aiming to show that not all victims react the same to rape; 
however the barrister went away with a new stereotype about ‘real’ victims.   Rape myths may 
also be perpetuated by the logic of the law, which compares cases with a hypothetical ‘ideal’ case 
(Hudson, 2002). For example, Temkin and Krahé (2008) argue that the idea of a stranger 
violently raping a ‘virtuous’ woman is often perceived as the norm against which to measure real 
situations. Attempts to explain low convictions rates solely with rape myths have been 
problematised, though, because the number of acquaintance rapes gaining conviction is higher 
than expected (Lovett, Uzelac, Hovarth and Kelly, 2007) and victims of other crimes are also 
harshly cross-examinedvii (Brereton, 1997). The problems faced by sexual violence victims are 
therefore not solely about rape myths, and it is important to explore the context of the CJS in 
order to move forward (Yancy Martin, 2005).  
Part of this context is that the CJS is made up of organisations, each with their own 
objectives and priorities. Yancy Martin (2005), a US researcher, argues that the need for legal 
personnel to fulfil their roles within these organisations is likely to be prioritised over any 
personnel empathy for the victim and so acts as a barrier to good practice. For example, she 
points out that the defence role requires barristers to perceive the victim as the accuser, with the 
defendant having every right to challenge the ‘accusation’. This is linked to another part of this 
context, the adversarial system.  
 
Adversarialism 
Adversarial systems are “essentially combative and competitive” (Ellison, 2000:45), with 
advocacy manuals referring to trials as battles between ‘warriors’ who must ‘break’ and ‘butcher’ 
the witness (Wellman, 1997). Although Wellman (1997) is now 15 years old, barristers in their 
mid-to-late-thirties would have been educated using these principles and more recent manuals 
retain a sense of manipulating evidence (see Bergman and Berman-Barret, 2008). Taslitz (1999) 
suggests this creates ‘macho adversarialism’, which promotes rationality and aggression (see also 
Collier, 1998); encouraging routine victim degradation because the focus is on winning rather 
than justice (see also Ellison, 2000). 
Although some victims find that the trial was better than they expected (Kebbell et al, 
2007); barristers frequently confuse, coerce and silence victims (Taslitz, 1999). Ellison (2000) 
links this to questioning techniques such as extensive repetition, frequent interruption, closed 
questions and demanding precise recollection of peripheral details (Ellison, 2000). Other authors 
refer to the use of irrelevant (Heenan and McKelvie, 1997) or leading questions, undertake 
‘pining out’viii and gradually refine witness’ comments to coincide with their argument (Kebbell et 
al, 2007). Ellison, (2000) and Smith (2009) suggest these techniques are ‘justified’ by barristers 
and judges in reference to their client’s interests and judges’ ability stop anything improper. 
However, Ellison (2001) questions the latter because protecting witnesses is often perceived as 
contradicting the judicial role of neutral umpire and judges tend to have biased views of what is 
improper since many were originally defence barristers. Improper questioning is also supposedly 
prevented by the various Codes of Conduct, for example that of the Bar Councilix. The two most 
discussed aspects of the Bar Code are the need to ‘promote and protect fearlessly by all proper 
and lawful means, his lay client’s best interests’ and the importance of not causing undue harm to 
witnesses or knowingly misleading the jury (see Bar Council, 2004; Sanders and Jones, 2007). 
Lees (1996) and Burton, Evans and Sanders (2007) observe that such Codes of Conduct are 
frequently breached without objection, though; possibly because the need to promote their 
client’s interests is perceived as overshadowing the demand for consideration of victims. Codes 
alone cannot guarantee ethical behaviour; since there are always loopholes and colleagues are 
unlikely to become whistle-blowers (Nicholson, 2006). In order to ensure ethical behaviour, 
Nicholson (2006) therefore argues that barristers must develop a moral character that 
encourages them to behave ethically. 
 
Alternative types of justice 
The problems identified in adversarialism make it important to compare responses in 
inquisitorial systems in continental Europe. Inquisitorial trials do not involve juries, with judges 
evaluating a dossier of evidence instead (Doak, 2008). Trials are therefore perceived as official 
enquiries rather than battles and evidence is mostly written rather than oral because judges are 
trusted to ignore ‘hearsay’ (Tak, 2003). This is considered advantageous for victims because they 
do not usually attend trial, although they may be asked supplementary questions in a private, 
pre-trial hearing (Ellison, 2001). However, Dutch defence barristers have been accused of 
improper questioning during pre-trial hearings, with the examining magistrate failing to 
intervene (Ellison, 2001). In addition, while countries with adversarial systems are the only 
countries with rape conviction rates classed as ‘low’; some inquisitorial countries also have 
worrying success ratesx (Kelly and Lovett, 2009). This may reflect the fact that adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems are not as dichotomous as traditionally statedxi (see Hodgson, 2008). 
Current understandings of justice and how it should be achieved have also been critiqued 
using alternative understandings such as parallel justice and feminist jurisprudence. Parallel 
justice argues for a more holistic understanding that does not rely solely on the CJS. Instead, it 
suggests that victim justice should be addressed by a parallel system, decoupling it from offender 
justice (Westmarland, 2008). This is because one institution cannot provide 100 percent of victim 
support and a more holistic, multi-agency approach is required (Koss, 2006; Westmarland, 
2008). Parallel Justice is therefore thought to provide an alternative concept of justice in which 
support is available regardless of what, if anything, is happening with the offender (Herman, 
1999; Westmarland, 2008).  
Nicholson’s (2000) notion of feminist jurisprudence can also provide an alternative to current 
responses. She uses this concept to critique the Enlightenment tradition of legal positivism 
around which the CJS is currently centred. This tradition prioritises ‘expert’ and scientific 
evidence over anecdotal evidence (Kelly, 2010); which may disproportionately affect rape 
victims whose trials often centre on anecdotal evidence about consent. Nicholson (2000) argues 
this positivist focus is problematic because the law should acknowledge the nuances of reality 
and barristers should actively focus on an ethic of care rather than winning (see also Ellison, 
2000). While Nicholson’s post-positivist perspective may be controversial to some, it is with this 
notion of an ethic of care that we wish to critique current responses to sexual violence. 
 
Methodology 
 
We used qualitative court observations because the research required rich data that recognised 
the complexities of trial processes. Court observations do not rely on retrospective or 
anticipatory accounts and can explore issues that are too familiar for those being researched to 
recognise (Foster, 2006). They also allow an exploration of controversial details that 
interviewees may omit (Sarantakos, 2005). Observations do have several limitations, though, for 
example personal or procedural reactivity (Robson, 2004). Several judges glanced at the 
researcher while speaking so her presence may have influenced them; however legal personnel 
are frequently observed so it is unlikely they significantly altered their actions. Our personal 
beliefs also inevitably influenced which details were recorded, although we actively looked for 
evidence of alternative perspectives to alleviate this (Darlington and Scott, 2002; Foster, 2006). 
Another limitation is that observations cannot explore meanings with the participants 
(Darlington and Scott, 2002), however our previous interviews with legal personnel explored 
many of these meanings.  
It is a criminal offence to bring recording equipment into court (Her Majesty’s Courts 
Service, 2009) and so the researcher made extensive notes, featuring as many direct quotes as 
possible. Although Lees (1996) gained access to court transcripts for her research, we did not 
attempt to negotiate such access because of time, financial costs, marginal possibility of success 
and lack of other information such as body language or voice tone. To focus the notes, we 
consulted existing literature and recommendations from the International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ) (2002) and Legal Momentum (2005). Demographic information on those involved, the 
nature of the prosecution and defence cases, and details about the indictment were therefore 
noted (ICJ, 2002; Legal Momentum, 2005). In addition, any delays, incidents occurring between 
court sessions, and what was said during the trial were also written down.  
Purposeful sampling was used; selecting a court based on regional court conviction rates 
for rape and attempted rape.  These statistics are available in Appendix I and show that the 
Western circuit was interesting since it is the only region where conviction rates have declined 
since 2003. Out of these Western circuit courts, we then chose a large Crown Court in which 
sexual violence trials are fairly common. Within this Crown Court, trials were then selected using 
opportunity sampling, as the researcher attended any adult sexual violence trial that started as 
soon as possible after the end of the previous trial. Six trials were observed over a three month 
period. Although small samples are often critiqued as being ungeneralisable, qualitative research 
tends to focus on analytic rather than statistical generalisation (Curtis, Gester, Smith and 
Washburn, 2000). This means that research explores how findings fit with wider theories rather 
than generating predictive rules for whole populations, making small samples less problematic 
(Curtis et al, 2000). In addition, six trials provided a lot of very rich detailed information, 
especially since trials tended to involve up to four days of observation. The trials were varied in 
the contexts and characteristics of those involved (see Appendix II for more information). Five 
trials involved a rape charge; however they also featured secondary charges such as sexual 
assault or inciting a family member to sexual conduct. The legal personnel were mostly white, 
middle class males, although there were some female barristers and one female judge. The 
victims were mostly white women, although one trial featured a white male victim with severe 
learning difficulties. 
The research focus on critically assessing legal cultures from an explicitly post-positivist 
perspective meant that critical discourse analysis (CDA) was useful (van Dijk 2003). CDA 
explores how power is produced, legitimated and challenged in ‘texts’, which are social actions 
and images as well as written words (Fairclough, 2001). The data were therefore analysed in the 
context of other texts and wider discourses (Wodak, 2004) and we identified how different actors 
were empowered or disempowered (Fairclough, 2001), as well as any challenges to dominant 
discourses (van Dijk, 2003). CDA has limitations, for example distinctions between the 
interpretations of the researcher and the intended audience are often ignored (Paltridge, 2006). 
Although we attempted to interpret events with legal personnel, witnesses and the jury in mind, 
the interpretations presented here are ultimately our own.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problems and Priorities: Observations on sexual violence trials 
The emergent themes from the data were: routine delays, the notion of ‘rational’ behaviour, 
extreme interpretations of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and ‘burden of proof’, and winning as 
priority.  
 
Routine delays 
The practicalities of trial were potentially very stressful for victims, especially in relation to 
delays while waiting to give evidence. All six trials featured delays, ranging from one hour in T1 
to over a day in T3; with the mean length of delay being four hours per trial. Most of these 
occurred over two days, with an average of 75 percent of delays occurring while the victim 
waited to give evidence. For example T4 featured almost six hours of delays, over five hours of 
which were while the victim was present, and in T5 all parties attended court only for the trial to 
be postponed. Delays occurred for multiple reasons, for example problems with special measures 
(T4), loss of jurors (T6) and childcare needs of both the victim and defendantxii (T3; T5). The 
most common cause, though, was the overrunning of other cases that judges dealt with each 
morning before trial. Delays were referred to: “We’ve got as much chance of starting today as 
Murray has of winning Wimbledon” (T4 prosecution, LDxiii). However these comments did not 
challenge the inevitability of the continual delays, suggesting that they were considered a routine 
aspect of trial.  
There was some resistance to this, for example two judges started trials later than usual in an 
attempt to prevent delays: 
 
“Shall we say 10:30. I have other cases at 10:00 that I have to deal with but I don’t want 
to keep you unnecessarily” (T1 judge, WT) 
 
“Out of an abundance of caution, I shall say quarter to 11. I shall do my best, I can’t 
promise anything, but quarter to 11 please” (T4 judge, WT). 
 
 
This is positive; however by qualifying her attempt at preventing delays with “I can’t promise 
anything”, the T4 judge did not wholly reject the ‘inevitability’ of delays. In addition, both trials 
were slightly delayed the following morning despite these attempts at prevention since even with 
the later start times, previous cases overran. 
Resistance was also evident in T6, where the judge released a missing juror after 1.5 hours 
in order to protect victim welfare. Despite wanting to wait further and shoulder more delays, the 
judge became proactive and began the trial for the victim’s sake because of his reduced attention 
span as a result of severe learning difficulties: “Were it not for the fact [victim] is waiting to give 
evidence, I would wait further... that is a luxury we cannot afford” (T6 judge, LD). However the 
overarching absence of proactivexiv attempts at preventing or challenging delays suggests they 
were normal and not considered hugely problematic by the court. 
 
Behaviour as ‘rational’ 
There was evidence that the CJS operates within a positivist context, leading to an assumption 
that behaviour is ‘rational’. This led to a strong focus on whether a victim’s actions were 
‘rational’, with no recognition that behaviour is often ‘irrational’. Instead, failure to act ‘logically’ 
was treated as suspicious and the assumption of ‘rational’ decision-making was used to argue the 
defendant would not commit rape: “He knew that the car was traceable to him...why would he be 
so stupid as to go on and rape the woman that he had been seen with only moments before?” (T3 
defence, WT). Actions were thus compared to hypothetical ‘normal’ situations based on logic: 
 
Defence: “And you say you were looking for the police?” 
Victim: “Yeah” 
Defence: “But you had your phone?” 
Victim: “Yeah” 
Defence: “So you could have called...so why did you say you were looking for a police 
car?” (T3, WT) 
 
“How come you came to be outside the club without her then? […] Why didn’t you wait 
for her outside the club? […] If you were supposed to go to her house, how was that 
going to work?” (T1 police to victim in video interview, WT). 
 
 
The latter quote is significant because it shows that witnesses were subjected to an assumption 
of rational behaviour during their evidence-in-chief as well as cross-examination. Having said 
that, one barrister did resist the notion of ‘irrational’ behaviour should be used against the victim: 
“The defence criticise her for not acting different on the night... [it is suggested she made ‘bad’ 
decisions]...but as we all know that can happen” (T1 prosecution, WT). This is a positive reminder 
that legal personnel cannot be treated homogenously.  
On several occasions, the ‘rational’ norm by which actions were measured was a rape myth. 
Whether or not the victim had a motive to lie, their emotionality and any delayed reporting were 
routinely portrayed as important in assessing the victim’s credibility. For example, ‘rational’ 
ideals were used to suggest that delayed reporting was suspicious, and immediate reporting was 
‘ideal’: 
 
“Why didn’t she call the police straight away?” (T3 defence, WT). 
 
“He went back… and told his carersxv immediately” (T6 prosecution, WT) 
 
 
This latter quote highlights how rape myths were not only used by defence barristers, but also 
referenced by the prosecution as support for the victim’s credibility.  
 
However there was some resistance to these stereotypes in T3 and T4: 
 
“She’s been criticised for not going straight to the police... experience shows that 
people react differently...it is not easy, members of the jury, to tell someone about it” 
(T3 prosecution, WT) 
 
“Why did she not tell someone...that is a valid question...on the other hand you may 
think...when abuse takes place it is often hard to tell somebody...that is a comment I 
make” (T4 judge, WT). 
 
 
In this latter quote, it was very positive to see a judge adopting one of the ‘myth-busting’ judicial 
directions outlined by the Judicial Studies Board (2010). 
There was also an assumption that victim credibility could be established by whether or not 
there was a ‘rational’ motive to make false allegations. For example: 
 
“Knowing perhaps if she can get her disciplinarian dad off the scene...then she can get 
back home again” (T4 defence, WT, during a trial where the defendant was the victim’s 
father) 
 
Prosecution: “You didn’t need any extra money?”  
Victim: “No” 
Prosecution: “You didn’t need to make a false allegation of rape” (T3, WT). 
 
 
Despite not explicitly mentioning compensation in T3, the defence had checked if the victim had 
made a claim. Several questions were also asked about the victim’s finances, with suggestions 
that “maybe there was a strong financial element to [the allegation]” (T3 defence, WT). The 
unfounded assumption that the victim had a ‘rational’ incentive to lie (i.e. to get compensation) 
was then used to suggest her evidence could not be trusted. 
 Evidence was also assessed using the victim’s emotionality, which refers to whether the 
victim was “emotional at appropriate points in appropriate ways” (T4 defence, LD). This assumes 
that emotional reactions can be rationally assessed and that victims will ‘naturally’ respond in 
similar ways. For example: “In relation to his later experience...[victim] was upset and 
agitated...does that sound like the sort of thing that [victim] might have made up, was he capable 
of making up” (T6  prosecution, WT). This quote shows once more that rape myths are not solely 
used by the defence to undermine victims, but also by prosecution barristers to support victim 
credibility. The usefulness of emotionality was supported by all legal personnel in most of the 
trials, with three judges actively directing juries to consider it in their decisions: 
 
“This is a case that essentially is going to depend on whether you believe what a 
witness is telling you...it is sometimes the case, not always, but sometimes, you can be 
assisted in evaluating what a witness is telling you by the manner in which they give 
it” (T4 judge, WT). 
 
 
The authority with which the three judges told the jury to use emotionality suggests that it may 
have been a routine part of their verdict deliberations.  
 
Extreme interpretations of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and ‘burden of proof’ 
In every trial, juries were directed not to convict unless several factors were present: “There 
are...fundamentals of law that you must appreciate...so that you can assess the evidence” (T1 
judge, WT). These are central to understanding justice in the current system, since juries were 
told that they must acquit if any of these requirements were absent. All legal personnel including 
prosecution barristers mentioned these factors, especially the need to be ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ (BRD) and the burden of proof being on the prosecution. 
In all trials, defence barristers reminded the jury not to convict unless they were sure of 
the truth. This was presented as the need to be 100 percent certain: “If you think there is any 
possibility, not probably lying or must be lying, but do you think there is ANY possibility...it’s not 
saying to her that she’s lying, it’s just saying I’m not sure” (T4 defence, WT). Although a high 
standard of proof is needed to protect innocent defendants, BRD only requires the absence of 
‘reasonable’ doubt, not any doubt at all. No legal personnel ever commented on this. When 
viewed in the positivist context of the CJS, with its focus on empirical evidence and ‘expert’ proof, 
certainty was then presented as impossible: 
 
“It’s just saying...how can I be sure? I wasn’t there at the time” (T4 defence, WT). 
 
“You have to say to yourselves ‘I simply cannot be sure’…what the scientists are saying is 
that we can’t be sure” (T6 defence, WT). 
 
Since barristers are authority figures, and no challenges arose from the prosecution or judges, 
these interpretations are likely to be taken seriously despite not being accurate.  
 It was then argued that due to the burden of proof being on the prosecution, doubt about 
the defendant was irrelevant and any doubt about the victim should result in acquittal: “You just 
need to be able to say that she has told you the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” 
(T3 defence, WT). While the 2003 Sexual Offences Act made the defendant accountable for 
proving consent, this was not mentioned, even in T3 where the victim feared violence because the 
defendant had a knife, and the burden remained wholly on the prosecution in all trials. The 
defence therefore only needed to create doubt in the victim’s story rather than belief in the 
defendant’s evidence: 
 
“[Prosecution] poses the question ‘well what was in it for her’...that question is a 
dangerous question because it threatens to undermine the whole basis on which you are 
here...the burden is on the prosecution” (T3 defence, WT) 
 
 “The law does not require the defence to come up with an explanation” (T4 prosecution, 
WT). 
 
This led to a focus on the victim, with judges reinforcing such opinions. For example, judicial 
summaries included directions such as: “The burden of proving [the charges] rests on the 
prosecution throughout; it is not for [defendant] to prove his innocence” (T4 judge, WT). While 
the defendants were subjected to manipulation during questioning, victims therefore suffered 
harsher manipulation tactics and more critical evaluations of their evidence. Barristers’ speeches 
also tended to focus on the victim, putting their actions and evidence on trial rather than the 
defendant: “You have to assess the central witness in the case” (T4 prosecution, WT). One 
barrister tentatively resisted this, arguing that “while the defence don’t have to prove anything, 
you have to look at the whole situation” (T4 prosecution, WT); constructing doubt about the 
defendant as context for decision-making. 
 
Winning as priority 
Barristers also frequently used manipulative questioning techniques to present certain evidence 
in certain ways, rather than gathering all the available evidence in a balanced manner. This 
suggests the focus of trial was on advancing their interests rather than truth-finding. All 
witnesses were subjected to this, but victims were especially vulnerable as they were most 
susceptible to criticism. Barristers primarily manipulated evidence by asking closed questions to 
control what information became public. Although more open questions were sometimes asked 
during evidence-in-chief, these tended to be about specific matters. When the defendant in T6 
attempted to stray from these closed answers, the judge reminded him that:  
“you’re not making a speech, you’re answering questions” (T6 judge, WT) 
 
“We want to hear your answers but it’s sufficient to say yes or no while [prosecution] 
puts his case to you” (T6 judge, WT).  
 
Both judges and barristers therefore reinforced the idea that defendants and witnesses were not 
present to tell their story, but rather as a tool with which barristers could introduce the 
information they desired. 
Barristers also manipulated the evidence using techniques like ‘pining out’ (see footnote viii), 
leading questions, pretending not to hear answers and gradually refining answers. For example: 
 
Defence: “It is entirely consistent that the sperm head is from [victim]” 
DNA expert: “[It is] quite unlikely that you can get DNA information from a single sperm 
head” 
Defence: “Let’s put it this way, that it’s certainly not inconsistent with the sperm head 
being [victim’s]” 
DNA expert: “No” 
Defence: “You can’t rule out that it’s [victim’s]” 
DNA expert: “No” (T6, WT). 
 
These tactics were used routinely, suggesting that questioning was about ensuring ‘truths’ are 
stated in such a way as to gain advantage over the other party. 
 In T6, there was some resistance to this as the victim had an intermediary, which is his 
statutory right under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 because of his learning 
difficulties. Her role was “to ensure [victim] understands the questions being asked and for us to 
understand his responses” (T6 judge, WT), for example by asking barristers to rephrase overly 
complicated questions. While she sometimes resisted pressure being put on the victim, for 
example: 
 
Judge: “Did the man walk to the school with you?”  
Victim is silent 
Intermediary: “I think [victim] feels under pressure to answer” (T6, WT); 
 
This is at the outer limits of her role, and she usually only raised issues about the technicalities of 
a question. For example: 
 
Defence: “Did you have any injuries on that day?” 
Victim is silent 
Intermediary: “Do you know what ‘injuries’ is?” 
Victim: “No” 
Intermediary: “Did you have any bruises or marks on your body?” 
Victim: “On my stomach” 
Defence: “Did any of that happen?” 
Intermediary: “You might need to recall what you’re talking about” (T6, WT). 
 
Evidence was not only manipulated by questioning techniques, but also by barristers focusing on 
irrelevant issues. Although defendants were also vulnerable to this, peripheral details were 
mostly discussed in relation to the victim because the interpretation of burden of proof led to a 
focus on victim credibility. For example, in T4 there was a great deal of questioning about the 
victim’s unemployment which was used to portray her as lazy and draw on class stereotypes to 
undermine her credibility: 
 
Defence: “I don’t think you were working, were you?” 
Victim: “No” 
Defence: “And I don’t think you were involved in caring for your [relative]?” 
Victim: “No” (T4, WT). 
 
Similar issues were discussed in T3, where the victim worked as a prostitute and was subjected 
to many stereotypes throughout the trial: 
 
Defence: “Were you on benefits?” 
Victim: “Yeah I was” 
Defence: “And the money that you made as a sex worker, did you spend that on the drugs 
you’ve told us you took?” 
Victim:  “Yeah” (T3, WT). 
 
These were used to invoke stereotypes and create an idea of ‘undeserving’ victims. One 
prosecution barrister resisted the relevance of these stereotypes, highlighting that the victim’s 
prostitution “doesn’t make her a second class victim” and so the jury should “treat her as a 
normal person...on an equal standing to any other person” (T3 prosecution, WT). The barrister’s 
choice of ‘treat her as a normal person’ rather than ‘is a normal person’ may reflect underlying 
judgement of the victim. In general, though, barristers focused on peripheral details in order to 
gain strategic advantage, highlighting the focus on winning rather than justice.  
 
Discussion 
The frequent delays observed support Payne’s (2009) argument that victims may experience 
unnecessary stress because of being left waiting to give evidence. In inquisitorial systems, victims 
avoid these practicalities because their written statements are usually deemed sufficient and so 
they do not have to attend trial (Ellison, 2001). This also means that trials primarily consider 
evidence gathered immediately after the offence, helping combat memory deterioration caused 
by a lapse of around one year between trial and reporting (Ellison, 2001). 
Inquisitorial approaches may not be as advantageous as commonly suggested, though. For 
example, although victims are not cross-examined and may not have to attend trial (Doak, 2008); 
they can be questioned several times pre-trialxvi (Sanders and Jones, 2007). In addition, 
protective measures for vulnerable witnesses are less comprehensive than in England and Wales, 
and any theoretical advantages can be undermined by the practice of legal personnel (Doak, 
2008). This can be seen in the improper questions asked by Dutch defence barristers during pre-
trial questioning, and the failure of examining magistrates to intervene (Doak, 2008; Ellison, 
2001). Indeed, some argue that countries with inquisitorial systems experience similar levels of 
rape myths to England and Wales, for example there can still be a focus on the victims’ clothing, 
motivation to lie and sexual history (Ellison, 2001). In addition, the focus on winning cannot be 
assumed to vanish simply because there is nominally a focus on finding out what happened; 
especially since the State is not always neutral and fair in its search for truth (Jörg, Field and 
Brants, 1995). It would therefore be overly optimistic to claim that rape victims are treated well 
in inquisitorial systems. Even if inquisitorialism was desirable, it cannot simply be imported 
because each CJS has a unique context that may cause inquisitorial approaches to take on a 
different nature in English and Welsh courts (Ellison, 2001; Taslitz, 1999).  
Despite this, the existence of some research suggesting victims are better treated within 
inquisitorial systems makes it at least worthy of discussion. In addition, many of these problems 
are related to the inadequate attitudes of legal personnel rather than the fundamental structures 
of the CJS as in adversarialism (Doak, 2008). This may be why Taslitz (1999), a US lawyer, rejects 
inquisitorialism, but believes we can still learn from inquisitorial principles. These principles are 
currently used more than is commonly acknowledged, for example the use of pre-recorded video 
evidence is arguably more compatible with inquisitorial than adversarial approaches to 
testimony. The Children’s Reporter Scheme in Scotland also currently deals with hearings 
involving children using similar values; with trials being like an inquiry where a lay tribunal 
discusses evidence with experts. This makes trials more about conversations than battles and 
allows greater reliance on written evidence gained pre-trial; enjoying the potential benefits of 
inquisitorial principles without embracing inquisitorialism. A similar approach could be 
developed for adult rape and sexual assault trials. 
Dripps (2009) acknowledged the problem of jury trials and suggested an innovative 
solution that did not result in the adoption of inquisitorialism, although it arguably uses 
inquisitorial principles. Dripps (2009) noted that despite procedural reform to improve 
conviction rates; rape trials remain problematic because jurors are influenced by stereotypes 
about male sexuality being naturally aggressive. As a result, Dripps (2009) argues that we should 
try rape cases in a specialist court without juries, instead relying on a judge or panel of lay-judges 
like those in a UK magistrate’s court. However, both Dripp’s US specialist court and UK 
magistrate’s courts can only impose a maximum six month sentence for a single crime (Dripps, 
2009). Dripps argues that this is better than nothing, as most rape trials end in acquittal. The idea 
of a specialist court is commendable; however the six months maximum is too much of a 
compromise when dealing with a serious crime like rape. In England and Wales, it may be 
possible to have judge-only trials without a maximum sentence of six months; however a 
legislative change would be needed in order to allow trial without jury. 
Another option is to draw on good practice that already exists in Specialist Domestic 
Violence Courts. These specialist courts aim to improve information-sharing and advocacy, 
raising victim satisfaction and satisfaction (Cook, Burton, Robinson, and Vallely, 2004). The 
personnel at the courts are specially trained and used to dealing with domestic violence cases, 
potentially making them more likely to act with sensitivity and reject stereotypes (Cook et al, 
2004). This is an important development on Dripps’ (2009) argument, which assumes that legal 
personnel do not believe gendered stereotypes about sexual behaviour despite a multitude of 
research to the contrary. While domestic violence courts are overwhelmingly in Magistrates 
Courts and so cannot be extended to sexual violencexvii, some of the provisions of Cardiff 
Domestic Violence Court extend to the Crown Court; which prioritises domestic violence cases, 
ensuring that trial listings are carefully considered and that cases are heard by experienced 
judges (Cook et al, 2004). Cook et al (2004) argued that these Crown Court provisions should be 
adopted in all Specialist Domestic Violence Courts, and so future research may benefit from 
exploring their potential benefits. In addition, while it may not be possible to use specialist courts 
to try rape cases without new legislation enabling Crown Court trials without juries; most of the 
benefits of specialist courts are about improving pre-trial hearings and this may be something 
that could be extended to include sexual violence. 
Returning to the discussion about adversarial systems, our research supports Ellison 
(2001) in that emotionality is perceived as central to evaluating witnesses. This ignores the fact 
that people react differently and express themselves in different ways (see also Payne, 2009). 
Visible distress was portrayed as the ‘logical’ reaction to rape, which homogenised victims and 
placed normative judgements on certain ways of communicating. This also ignored the element 
of interpretation that occurs when two people communicate, meaning that a victims’ emotions 
could be misinterpreted by legal personnel or jurors. Until the focus on emotionality as a sign of 
veracity is addressed, the victim’s attendance at trial may continue to be considered essential and 
victims will remain vulnerable to the stress caused by cross-examination and routine disruptions. 
The findings also highlight the positivist context of the CJS, which impacts upon 
understandings of how justice can be achieved. This led to the assumption that there was a single 
‘truth’ to be uncovered and that empirical or ‘scientific’ evidence was the most legitimate method 
of finding it. The positivist context also caused a focus on ‘rationality’ and meant that ‘truth’ was 
established by whether or not a witness’s actions conformed to a hypothetical ‘logical’ ideal. 
Victims therefore needed to defend ‘irrational’ actions that were deemed suspicious despite our 
actions being more messy and complicated than clear-cut and ‘rational’ (Nicholson, 2000). This 
makes victims more vulnerable to being discredited since these perceived irrationalities can 
become the focus of the defence case.  
 The hypothetical norms used to assess the victim’s actions were often rape myths or 
other, class-based, stereotypes that undermined victim credibility. In life, though, people do not 
act rationally or consistently and rape can happen to anyone regardless of whether they are 
considered socially ‘deviant’. While it would be easy to blame juries for believing such rape 
myths, the constant focus on peripheral details may cause jurors to consider issues they 
otherwise would not. Legal personnel are in positions of authority and their focus on such issues 
may indicate to jurors that this is what matters. Training legal personnel about rape myths is one 
possible ‘solution’ to this; however defence barristers used rape myths even when the 
prosecution noted their non-truth. Barristers may therefore invoke stereotypes despite knowing 
they are false, possibly because of the longstanding adversarial focus on winning in whatever 
way is possible (see also Ellison, 2001). It is therefore not enough, as the 2007 SVAAP suggests, to 
simply train legal personnel. In addition, the focus on comparing situations with hypothetical 
‘rational’ norms effectively makes stereotypes the yardstick by which a witness’s evidence is 
evaluated and perpetuates their use (see also Hudson, 2002). As long as there is a focus on 
winning and using ‘rationality’ to assess witness evidence, rape myths and other stereotypes will 
continue to feature prominently in trials. 
The findings also highlight inappropriate questioning, which may reduce the quality of 
evidence heard; especially when cases involve particularly vulnerable witnesses like the victim 
and defendant with learning difficulties in T4. Bull (2010) suggests that asking open questions 
and avoiding leading or suggestive questions is therefore essential (see also Kebbell and Johnson, 
2000). The demeanour of the person asking the questions may also be important, since more 
authoritative demeanours make vulnerable witnesses less able to recall accurate information and 
less willing to disclose information (Bull, 2010). This makes it even more important to question 
witnesses in an appropriate way, ensuring that high-quality information is produced (Bull, 2010; 
Ellison, 2000; 2001; Kebbell and Johnson, 2000). 
Legal personnel, especially defence barristers, also interpreted procedural rules in an 
extreme form without being challenged by judges. Reasonable doubt does not mean the absence 
of any doubt and the presumption of innocence does not mean that doubt about the defendant 
should be ignored. This was never highlighted by legal personnel, possibly due to informal rules 
about judicial passivity (see Ellison, 2001) or shared cultural understandings about the meanings 
of BRD and burden of proof. The effects of these interpretations on rape trials are not addressed 
in current literature, but studies show that the way in which BRD is defined can impact upon 
conviction rates (Wright and Hall, 2007). For example, a US study explored the effect of varying 
BRD definitions on mock murder trials and found that stronger definitions led to significantly 
fewer convictions when evidence was ‘weak’ (Horowitz and Kirkpatrick, 1996). This could affect 
rape trials in that evidence is often considered ‘weak’ because trials are frequently one person’s 
word against another. This must be explored by future research.  
Extreme interpretations of the burden of proof are also important because they imply the 
2003 Sexual Offences Act has not successfully made defendants more accountable for proving 
reasonable belief in consent. This ineffectiveness may be due to the requirements of Section 75, 
which states it is the defendant’s responsibility to prove consent only if the prosecution proves 
certain factors first (see Sexual Offences Act, 2003). These factors include that the victim was 
unconscious or experienced actual or threatened violence. The prosecution case often hinges on 
such issues anyway, and so proving them before the defendant becomes accountable for proving 
consent effectively requires proving the case anyway. We found no academic research in relation 
to these issues and this must be rectified if policy effectiveness is to be improved; especially since 
these extreme interpretations may partially explain low conviction rates and the excessive 
criticism of victims.  
As previously noted, barristers’ priorities reflect the adversarial focus on winning (Ellison 
2000). This may help explain the continued use of inappropriate questioning techniques, 
perpetuation of rape myths and extreme formulations of procedural rules. Adversarial principles 
are used to assert that judges will stop anything improper and so barristers should “fearlessly 
promote their client’s interests” (Bar Council, 2004). However, there is literature suggesting that 
judges have their own biases (Crow and Gertz, 2008; Hucklesby, 1997; Rumgay, 1995) and a 
culture of judicial passivity is rife in English and Welsh courts (Ellison, 2000). It is therefore 
important to begin addressing such cultures and explore comparisons with inquisitorial systems 
in order to improve responses to vulnerable victims.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This study observed trials to explore the problems faced by rape complainants in court. The 
emergent themes were: routine delays, prioritisation of ‘rational’ behaviour, extreme 
interpretations of ‘BRD’ and ‘burden of proof’, and winning as priority. This contributes to the 
existing literature, which tends to rely on interviews and often fails to explore the adversarial 
context of trials. It also contributes to the wider literature on victims, since many of the findings 
are applicable to non-sexual violence trials. It is important to remember, though, that very 
vulnerable victims are likely to be disproportionately affected by common legal tactics and rape 
is a clear example of a crime that causes heightened vulnerability (Ellison, 2000). 
There were some positive findings, for example most judges did appear to consider 
victims as long as this did not impact upon the usual running of trial. This supports Stern’s (2010) 
and Yancy Martin’s (2005) claims that there is reason to celebrate, yet there were also many 
issues requiring fundamental change. While short-term solutions such as training legal personnel 
about sexual history evidence (Kelly et al, 2006) are important, they must not distract us from 
radical reform. This is especially true since many short-term recommendations cannot be 
successful without simultaneously addressing these underlying problems. In terms of short-term 
change, the findings highlight several areas for immediate improvement. For example, the 
Listings Office should allow at least 15 minutes per case dealt with before trial, rather than the 5 
or 10 minutes currently left. This would minimise delays by allowing more leeway if the prior 
cases run late. Trials should also start in the afternoon on the first day so that the victim is not 
summoned until the following morning and can avoid the delays that occur pre-trial (see also 
Payne, 2009).  
Introducing victim’s lawyers could also make immediate improvements (see also Stern, 
2010). As previously stated, there needs to be more discussion about the role these lawyers 
should undertake. The most appropriate role would be protecting victims from inappropriate 
questioning and objecting to extreme interpretations of BRD or burden of proof. In terms of the 
practicalities of this; key questions include what the relationship between the prosecution and 
victims’ barrister should be and what should be the consequences of a victims’ lawyer’s objection. 
Here, we do not have all the answers and hope that this article can stimulate debate about these 
important issues. For example, the victims’ lawyer could provide input into the prosecution’s trial 
strategy, but the prosecutor would remain in control. They could also object to the defence line of 
questioning without the prosecution’s permission, but not be involved in any decision-making 
discussions about the objection other than to briefly explain why the questions were 
inappropriate. These objections could only be about matters of law, for example that questions 
were more prejudicial than probative, and so would not change the prosecution’s responses to 
legitimate defence arguments. In this way, the victims’ lawyer could act as an ‘evidentiary 
watchdog’, much like the judge and prosecution barrister are meant to be but are not. While 
training judges to do this may be a more popular solution, training about other habits has not 
proved effective in achieving consistent change and the fear of appeal due to excessive 
intervention may prevent judges from speaking upxviii (Ellison, 2000). Using victim’s lawyers to 
bring these objections may therefore appease the problems faced by sexual violence victims 
without requiring long term cultural changes. Having said this, we acknowledge that the 
implementation of victim’s lawyers may also require a cultural change, especially if they are 
expected to successfully challenge a judge.  
Most importantly, fundamental change is required to shift priorities away from simply 
winning and onto a more balanced approach. While this may seem idealistic, existing attempts at 
improving the situation are not being effective and we need to be more creative in thinking what 
currently appears ‘unthinkable’. This approach would focus on finding out what happened, the 
perceived truth from both sides, using processes informed by both an ethic of care for the victim 
and due process protection of the defendant. This is easier said than done, but some authors 
argue it can be achieved (Walsh and Bull, 2010). In practice this may involve changes to legal 
education so that the culture of winning at any cost is addressed early on. Solicitors could be 
encouraged to instruct barristers on the basis of their fairness as well as their case ‘success’ rate 
in terms of convictions or acquittals, ensuring that barristers adopting an ethic of care are not 
penalised in their career. Further research is required to establish the best way of doing this, but 
it could start by including this principle in ethical codes of conduct. In addition, training for legal 
personnel should highlight that “a fair trial does not mean a trial which is free from all possible 
detriment or disadvantage to the accused” (Doak, 2008:247). The protection of defendants’ rights 
is often used to justify poor victim treatment, so highlighting that victim and defendant rights are 
not a ‘zero-sum’ game may promote the uptake of an ethic of care.  
An ethic of care could also be developed by exploring the principles of inquisitorialism. 
Although we have already noted that inquisitorial systems are not perfect and cannot simply be 
imported, it would be useful to explore whether rape trials could implement similar principles; 
for example preventing victims from having to attend trial (if they do not want too) and so 
avoiding many of the problems trials cause. Most realistically, though, an ethic of care may be 
developed through extending some of the provisions in Specialist Domestic Violence courts to 
sexual violence cases. A more detailed discussion of Specialist Domestic Violence Courts is not 
possible in this article but it is something that must be further explored by research. While we 
have not provided exhaustive answers to the problems raised in this article, we hope to have 
initiated a useful discussion in moving responses to vulnerable victims forward. 
                                                          
i
  ‘Attrition’ here means the number of reported cases that do not reach conviction. 
ii
 ‘Proceeded’ refers to the instigation of legal action, for example the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision to charge. 
iii
 Cases were proceeded against for rape and attempted rape. 
iv
 ‘The Prosecutors’ Pledge’ consists of ten promises made to victims to ensure they receive a minimum standard of 
treatment. It includes a promise to provide special measures for vulnerable witnesses, to keep victims informed, to have 
two-way communication between the victim and prosecutor, and to remind victims of their police statement on the day 
of trial (CPS, 2005). 
v
 Professor Cheryl Thomas has funding to undertake research into jury attitudes on special measures. This will be the first 
attempt at exploring the effects of video link through more than the attitudes of legal personnel. 
vi
 SARCs are Sexual Assault Referral Centres (see Lovett, Regan and Kelly, 2004). 
vii
 Having said this, sexual violence victims face different constructions of ‘deserving’ victims and ‘normal’ behaviour 
(Brereton, 1997). In addition, the specific trauma caused by rape arguably makes sexual violence victims more 
vulnerable to the effects of stereotypes and aggressive cross-examination (Ellison, 2001). 
viii
‘Pining out’ refers to the wa 
y barristers get a witness to agree with certain facts before getting to their main argument,  then arguing that this means 
the witness must logically agree with the barrister’s whole argument. For example, getting a witness to agree they are 
outgoing, then arguing this means it is suspicious that they did not tell anybody about the attack. 
ix
 The Bar Council Code of Conduct (2004) is a 368 page document outlining professional conduct for barristers in England 
and Wales. It covers topics such as fundamental principles that should guide their work and practical responses to 
situations such as disclosure of guilt, gaining and accepting instructions, and how to act at trial.  
x
  For example in 2006, the Portuguese conviction rate was only 12 percent (Kelly and Lovett, 2009). 
xi
 Many argue that CJSs feature elements of both inquisitorialism and adversarialism (Hodgson, 2008; Raitt, 2010) and that 
countries within each tradition are often homogenised, making them appear more similar than they are (Hodgson, 
2008). However, these concepts are still useful for understanding the contexts of each CJS (Field, 2009). 
xii
 This is despite the fact that Witness Care Units are supposed to organise childcare arrangements for victims 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
xiii
Quotes came from a range of contexts. We have therefore marked each quote with ‘LD’, ‘WT’ or ‘PC’. ‘LD’ stands for 
‘legal discussion’ and refers to discussions between legal personnel that occurred in the courtroom but without the jury 
present. ‘WT’ stands for ‘within trial’ and refers to quotes from within the courtroom and with the jury present. Finally, 
‘PC’ stands for ‘personal communication’ and refers to comments made by legal personnel directly to the researcher 
while the trial was in recess and without other legal personnel present. 
xiv
Although legal personnel made comments about delays, they did so in a neutral way as if delays were inevitable. The 
comments were therefore basic grumbling rather than a perception of delays as a serious problem. 
xv
 In this context, carers are people responsible for the everyday care of vulnerable people, for example people with severe 
learning difficulties. In this case, the victim lived in a residential home for people with learning difficulties and the 
‘carers’ being discussed were professionals who worked there. 
xvi
 Although it is worth noting that victims can also be interviewed several times by police in England and Wales (Skinner 
and Taylor, 2009). 
xvii
 Rape and other sexual violence cases can only be dealt with in Crown Courts. 
xviii
 There is some suggestion that judges have got better at intervening when inappropriate questions are asked, however 
the present research did not find evidence of judicial intervention over irrelevant questioning and there is consensus 
that prosecutors remain too wary of intervening over these issues. 
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Appendix I 
 
Number of defendant’s proceeded against at Magistrates Court and found guilty at all courts for rape and attempted rape: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics are for England and Wales, 2003 to 2007(2)(3), broken down by Government Office Region. 
 
 
(1) The statistics relate to persons for whom these offences were the principal offences for which they were dealt with. When a defendant was found guilty of two or more offences, the principal offences is the offence for 
which the heaviest penalty is imposed. Where the same disposal is imposed for two or more offences, the offence is selected for which the statutory maximum penalty is the most severe. 
 
(2) Every effort is made to ensure that the figures presented are accurate and complete. However, it is important to note that these data have been extracted from large administrative data systems generated by the 
courts and police forces. As a consequence, care should be taken to ensure data collection processes and their inevitably limitations are taken into account when those data are used. 
 
(3)  Based on the proportion of those proceeded against who were found guilty. 
 
Source: Justice Statistics Analytical Services - Ministry of Justice. 
Ref: 536-09 
 
 
Proceeded against   Found guilty 
 
Conviction rate (%) 
(1)
 
Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
North East 144 120 146 141 117  32 42 32 50 51  22 35 22 35 44 
North West 447 401 425 370 370  97 104 118 131 116  22 26 28 35 31 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 245 252 268 218 191  75 103 120 112 118  31 41 45 51 62 
East Midlands 206 221 232 176 140  59 69 68 71 68  29 31 29 40 49 
West Midlands 335 324 280 281 248  81 93 108 84 92  24 29 39 30 37 
East of England 181 210 198 179 119  43 55 61 63 53  24 26 31 35 45 
London 637 516 640 589 557  132 121 118 151 156  21 23 18 26 28 
South East 291 279 348 303 299  59 67 87 96 111  20 24 25 32 37 
South West 155 168 145 174 184  56 53 49 74 58  36 32 34 43 32 
Wales 149 198 144 136 138  39 44 35 31 50  26 22 24 23 36 
England & Wales 2,790 2,689 2,826 2,567 2,363   673 751 796 863 873   24 28 28 34 37 
